psychology
Contents
Some notes on papers / books surrounding psychology, especially evolutionary psychology and the psychology of explanation. These are notes on the authorsâ points and not an endorsement of their views.
6.8. psychology#
6.8.1. explanations#
6.8.1.1. psychology of xai (miller, 2006)#
people employ certain biases (kahneman, 2011) and social expectations (hilton, 1990) when they generate and evaluate explanation
4 properties
Explanations are contrastive â they are sought in response to particular counter- factual cases â people do not ask why event P happened, but rather why event P happened instead of some event Q
Explanation are selected (in a biased manner) â people use cognitive biases to expect and give specific causes rather than all the possible real causes
Probabilities probably donât matter â while truth and likelihood are important in explanation and probabilities really do matter, referring to probabilities or statistical relationships in explanation is not as effective as referring to causes
Explanations are social â they are a transfer of knowledge, presented as part of a conversation or interaction, and are thus presented relative to the explainerâs beliefs about the explaineeâs beliefs.
philosophical foundations
âTo explain an event is to provide some information about its causal historyâŚâ
2 types of causal definitions: dependence (e.g. probabilistic model) or transference (physical causation)
2 types of (perceived) causes: internal (due to an actor) vs external (due to situation / environment)
explanation is an answer to a why-question
abductive reasoning - deriving a hypothesis to explain observed phenomenon
âinference to the best explanationâ (harman)
contrasts with inductive reasoning - accepting a hypothesis via scientific experiments
contrasts - lots of possible contrasts given a question, often communicated using tone
overton gives 5 categories and 4 relations that define building blocks for any scientific explanation
social attribution - big emphasis on intentionality
folk psychology does not describe how we think; it describes how we think we think
while people attribute less intentionality to aggregate groups than to individuals, they attribute more intention- ality to jointly acting groups than to individuals (oâlaughlin & malle)
side-effect effect = knobe effect - asymmetry of responses of side effects in harm/help scenarios - moral character of consequences influences how non-moral aspects (e.g. intentionality) are judged
cause could be the same as âmorally or institutionally responsibleâ
cognitive processes used in explanation
causal connection - process people use to identify the causes of events
explaining (which forces people to think more systematically about the abduction process) is good for fostering generalisations, but this comes at a cost of over-generalisation (williams et al.)
âIdentifying something as an instance of a kind and explaining some of its properties in terms of its being the kind of thing it is are not two distinct activities, but a single cognitive activity.â (prasada)
people tend to focus more on abnormal causes and also differ based on their perspective (kahneman & tversky)
explanation selection - process people use to select a small subset of identified causes as the explanation
contrastive, abnormality, intentionality, functionality, necessity, sufficienty, robustness, responsibility, blame
explanation evaluation - processes an explainee uses to evaluate the quality of an explanation
probability, simplicity, generalizability, and coherence with prior beliefs.
explanation is social - often is conversational
Griceâs maxims of conversation: quality, quantity, relation, and manner
only say what you believe; only say as much as is necessary; only say what is relevant; and say it in a nice way
6.8.1.2. The structure and function of explanations (lombrozo 2006)#
explanation structures
accommodate novel info in the context of prior beliefs
do so in a way that fosters generalization
background
explanations answer why questions
cognitive science has embraced explanation with regard to concepts and prior knowledge
explanations affect: (1) prob. assigned to causal claims, (2) how properties are generalized, (3) learning
predominant concepts
causation
pattern subsumption - this knowledge constrains what causes are probable/relevant
function of explanations: predict/control the future, constraint for generalization
causal inference - depends on prior beliefs + statistical evidence
explanations constrain causal inference based on prior beliefs
e.g. âif provided with evidence that cars of a particular color and size have better gas mileage, children and adults will disregard the confounding factor of color to conclude that car size causes the mileage differenceâ
people often offer explanations over evidence, especially when evidence is sparse
generating explanations for why a claim might be true provides a way to assess the probability of that claim in light of prior beliefs
âwhen generated from true beliefs, explanations provide an invaluable source of constraint; when generated from false beliefs, explanations can perpetuate inaccuracy.â
generalization of properties
basics of generalization
similarity: property is more likely to generalize to a new case if new case is similar
diversity: for generalizing to a broader category, property is more likely to generalize with more diverse evidence
explanations can override these basics
generalization of knowledge systems
self-explanation aids learning
âExplaining to oneself thus facilitates generalization to transfer problems by isolating
relevant senses of similarity, helping learners to overcome âthe frailties of inductionââ
differences between explanation and causal reasoning
âsome beliefs are privileged at the expense of othersâ - relevance determines which causal factors matter
âprior knowledge might not be deployed through other meansâ - e.g. âexplaining why a claim might be true or false changes the perceived probability of that claimâ
âproperties of explanations, such as their generality or simplicity, can influence probabilistic judgementsâ
6.8.1.3. Causal Explanation (lombrozo & vasilyeva 2017)#
explanations appeal to causes (although not all explanations are causal e.g. mathematics)
causal inference here not the same as the way it is used in statistics
6.8.1.3.1. causal inference w/ explanations#
âinference to the best explanationâ - believe hypothesis that best explains the data
this is not just bayesian inference (a common assumption)
rather, it includes explanatory considerations such as simplicity, scope, and explanatory power
these things may improve short-term accuracy and make things easier to communicate/remember/use
it is possible that these things could be captured by a hierarchical bayesian model with appropriate priors / likelihoods
simplicity (lombrozo 2007) - explanation simplicity trades off w/ statistical likeliness
(lombrozo 2012) adults more likely to choose likeliness and all more like to choose likeliness for tasks with less apparent causal explanations
(pacer & lombrozo, 2017) explanation includes node simplicity = number of causes (nodes in graphical model) + root simplicity = number of unexplained causes (roots in graphical model)
people seem to only be sensitive to node simplicity
explanatory scope - how many things does this explanation imply (even if the others arenât tested)
e.g. does a diagnosis predict additional effects not yet tested? people prefer diagnoses with narrower scope (khemlani, sussman, and oppenheimer 2011)
explanatory power - peopleâs explanations better predict their estimates of posterior probability than do objective probabilites on their own (douven & schupbach, 2015a, 2015b)
other considerations, such as coherence, completeness, manifest scope
6.8.1.3.2. causal discovery w/ explanations#
causal discovery = causal model learning
engaging in explanation influences causal model learning
being prompted to explain can promote understanding
makes them more likely to find underlying causal models
(walker et al. 2016) - children asked to explain more attune to both evidence and prior beliefs
also sometimes reinforces peopleâs prior beliefs (right or wrong)
explaining âinvolved the integration of new information into existing knowlÂedgeâ (Chi, De Leeuw, Chiu, and LaVancher, 1994)
reasons why explanation alters causal learning
attention - explanation doesnât just boost attention - leads to specific benefits / deficits
motivation - explaining plays a motivational role (e.g. gopnik 2000 âExplanation as orgasmâ)
i.e. people seeking good explanations motivates causal understanding
explanation favors finding hypotheses with âlovelyâ causes
however, some studies find that children prompted to explain outperform controls even when they donât generate the right explanation
6.8.1.3.3. causal responsibility w/ explanations#
causal responsibility = to which cause(s) do we attribute a given effect?
ex. âwhy did she slip?â - either âshe is clumsy!â or âthe staircase is slippery!â
classic ANOVA model (Kelley 1967) says ppl analyze covariation between factors such as person, stimulus, and situation but more seems to be involved
different questions have different âcontrast classâ (van Fraasesen, 1980, philosophy) - why did she slip? vs why did she slip on the stairs?
different questions shift things to causal relevance and not just probability
6.8.1.4. explanation taxonomy#
Aristotleâs 4 âcausesâ or modes of explanation
cause
description
example
efficient
proximal mechanisms of change
a carpenter is an efficient cause of a bookshelf
final (functional, teleological)
the end, function or goal
holding books is a final cause of a bookshelf
formal
the form or properties that make something what it is
having shelves is a formal cause of a bookshelf
material
the substance of which something is constituted
wood is a material cause of a bookshelf
final causes
e.g. camouflage causes zebra stripes
real cause is a preceding intution
experiments suggest final causes are only accepted well when there is some causal link
e.g. adults who believe in God are more likely to accept scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations
another taxonomy: inherent vs. extrinsic explanations (cimpian & salomon, 2014)
formal explanations
pretty limited to category membership
e.g. Zach diagnoses ail ments because he is a doctor
these can be seen as constitutive (not causal): e.g. has four legs bc dog, but not is red bc is barn (even though most barns are read)
âexistence of a whole presupposes the existence of its parts, and thus the existence of a part is rendered intelligible by identifying the whole of which it is a partâ (prasada & dillingham 2009)
people who gave different explanations (e.g. functional vs material) also generalized differently to different categories (lombrozo 09)
two types of relationships - when bouth are present people opt for dependence
dependence = counterfactually - if cause didnât occur, effect wouldnât have occurred
transference = physical connection, e.g. continuous mechanism / conserved physical quantity
6.8.1.5. causal mechanisms#
mechanism - spells out the intermediate steps between some cause and some effect
sometimes these are seen as explanations
alternative define mechanisms as complex systems that involve a (typically hierarchiÂcal) structure and arrangement of parts and processes, such as that exhibited by a watch, a cell, or a socioeconomic system
interlevel relationships are constitutive, not causal (e.g. saying molecules rub against one another - this is heat (contintutive) but people often misconstrue this is causal)
explanations can accomodate both types of relationships
6.8.1.6. misc explanation work#
Evaluating computational models of explanation using human judgments (pacer, williams, chen, lombrozo, & griffiths, 2013) [PDF]
overton 2012 finds that explanations used something general (ex. model) to explain something specific (ex. data)
subsequent analysis overton 2012 finds âinference to the best explanationâ - use specific instances (ex. data) to draw general inferences
waskan et al 2014 - must be actually intelligible
lombrozo 2011 - explanations are intrinsically valuable, but also play an important instrumental role in the discovery and confirmation of intuitive theories, which in turn support prediction and intervention
explanations should be understood in terms of their role in generating understanding (Achinstein 1983; Wilkenfeld 2014), supporting future judgments (Craik 1943; Heider 1958; Quine & Ullian 1970), or motivating the construction of causal theories (Gopnik 2000)
explanations play a role in generalizing from known to novel cases (Rehder 2006; Sloman 1994; Lombrozo & Gwynne 2014)
sometimes impedes learning about properties that are idiosyncratic
explanatory errors and âillusionsâ can help us identify when and why engaging in explanation is so often beneficial
functional approach: why do we want explanations?
the best explanation for persuasion or efficient storage of information, for example, may not be the one that best supports future prediction.
evidence (=the explanandum) provides for some hypothesis (=the explanans).
given causal thing what is best explanation
most relevant explanation model or explnatory tree model
human explanatory judgments track something more like evidence, information, or relevance, and not simply the prior or posterior probability of the explanans
desiderata
simplicity
if simplicity does inform explanatory preferences, it is trumped or made moot by probability
count simplicity vs root simplicity (root is often preferred)
fruitfulness
generally explanations with broader scope are better except for causal stuff
explanations + learning
explanation magnifies our prior beliefs
ânegative programâ - empirical results disprove philosophical intuitions
6.8.2. the invisible gorilla#
We think we experience much more of our physical world than we do
We generally only see what weâre looking for
Our memory is very fake
We have a belief in shortcuts to expand our brainâs abilities
ex. Lumosity
6.8.3. the moral animal#
Why We Are, the Way We Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology - Robert Wright, 1965. Notes in this section are not an endorsement of the authorâs views.
6.8.3.1. sex, romance, and love#
6.8.3.1.1. darwin comes of age#
Emile Durkheim - father of modern sociology
Wilson - initial book sociobiology was vehemently opposed
reactive against connotations of social darwinism
social darwinism is linked to eugenics
genes affect human nature in two ways
existence of guilt
developmental program to calibrate guilt
6.8.3.1.2. male and female#
have to consider environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA)
many studies on !Kung San of the Kalahari desert in Africa
throughout nature, females are more coy while males are more promiscuous
this is true of every known human society
Samoa example was thought to be different, but this study was refuted
true with turkeys (who can be seduced by a wooden female turkey head)
difference is due to amount of male parental investment
apes
ex. gorilla alpha male claims all the women
ex. gibbons are monogamous - live in family units separate from others
sing duets
6.8.3.1.3. gender differences in evolution#
ideas that humans are a pair-bonding species
humans require high male parental investment (MPI)
vulnerable offspring
more education from two parents
genetically speaking, for males, worst thing is raising a child that isnât theres
experiments suggest they are most angry at sexual infidelity
historically, sometimes killed children that werenât theirs
quantity of sperm depends heavily on the amount of time a maleâs mate has been out of his sight lately
genetically speaking, for females, worst thing is being abandoned
experiments suggest females are relatively more angry at emotional infidelity
however, can still be genetically useful for a female to be unfaithful
can extract gifts for sex - âresource extractionâ
they donât advertise their ovulation - âseeds of confusionâ
madonna-whore dichotomy - a psychological phenomenon which groups females into 2 categories: marriage / fling
perhaps example of frequency-dependent selection
ex. blugill sunfish
normal males make nests and guard eggs
drifter males sneak around and fertilize othersâ eggs
nature strikes a balance between both
in actuality, should be able to guage situation and switch between different behaviors
self-esteem might be biological marker that helps with this
males are more likely to gain from leaving a marriage
females only have ~25 fertile years
6.8.3.1.4. the marriage market#
polygamy, initially, seems to benefit males
one male can get more females
why monogamy
ecologically imposed - if people are struggling to survive, a woman shouldnât share a man with another
they wonât have enough resources
socially imposed - in economic unequal societies (like today)
these societies are the ones that have dowry
imagine 1000 men and 1000 women -> polygyny actually hurts the men
therefore, monogamy likely evolved to stop the dangers of men without wives
current divorce rates are high, hurting all alike
Charles Darwin focused on wealth, Emma focused on looks, they were married happily
6.8.3.4. morals of the story#
6.8.3.4.1. darwinian (and freudian) cynicism#
Freud
id - animal
ego - interprets id to superego
superego
6.8.3.4.2. evolutionary ethics#
John Millâs utilitarianism is a good starting point
morality best preserves non-zero sumness
6.8.3.4.3. blaming the victim#
âgenetic determinismâ pops up in court cases (cases like insanity)
notion of free will is shrinking
less retributive of justice - more emphasis on deterrence, improving utilitarianism
rage of juries may wane as they come to believe that male philandering is ânaturalâ
6.8.3.4.4. darwin gets religion#
doctrines thus far likely have âharmonyâ with human nature
we are designed to believe that next rung on ladder will bring bliss, but in reality it will evaporate shortly after we get there
why religion
power to religion makers
mutual benefits for leaders and people
we came to empathize with all people
6.8.3.4.5. general tips#
distinguish between behavior and mental organ governing it
remember that mental organ, not behavior, is what was actually designed by natural selection
these organs may no longer ba daptive
human mind is incredibly complex
6.8.4. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion#
jonathan haidt, 2012
questions
eating dead dog
ripping up american flag
sex with chicken
incest
parochial - having a limited or narrow outlook or scope; of or relating to a church parish
6.8.4.1. intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second#
elephant and rider metaphor
6.8.4.1.1. where does morality come from#
nativist - morality is innate
empiricist - morality is from childhood learning
rationalist - morality is self-constructed by children on the basis of their experience with harm
kids know harm is wrong because they hate to be harmed and learn its is wrong to harm others
came to reject this answer
new study
moral domain varies by culture
rich, westerners tend to differentiate between social constructions and moral harms while others donât
westerners are individualistic - harm and fairness
other cultures are sociocentric
disgust and disrepect drive reasoning - moral reasoning is posthoc fabrication
in fact, morality is probably some combination of 1 & 2
6.8.4.1.2. intuitive dog and rational tail#
Plato - reason (mind) is master of emotions
Hume - reason is the servant of passions
Jefferson - reason and sentiment are indpeendent co-rulers
Haidt believes in 2
Antonio Damasio writes Descartesâ error where patients are missing ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
they couldnât have emotion
where difficult to reason without emotion - too many choices
intuitionism - calls reasoning rider and intution elephant
rider developed to help elephant
social intuitionism - other people can alter intuitions
6.8.4.1.3. elephants rule#
brain can make snap judgements in 1/10 second
can predict 2/3 outcomes of senate / house elections based on attractiveness in this time
intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second
smells etc can influence our moral judgements
6.8.4.1.4. vote for me (and hereâs why)#
conscious reasoning immediately justifies intuitive response
self-esteem doesnât make evolutionary sense, since being in groups was what mattered
rather, self-esteem measureâs oneâs fitness as a mate / group member
experimental evidence for confirmation bias
moral/political matters - we are often groupish rather than selfish
6.8.4.2. thereâs more to morality than harm and fairness#
be suspicious of moral monomists
6.8.4.2.1. beyond WEIRD mentality#
WEIRD - western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic - outliars, but often used
Schwederâs three ethics
autonomy - individual rights
community - group relationships
divinity - purity
there is more to morality than harm and fairness
6.8.4.2.2. taste buds of the righteous mind / 7 - the moral foundations of politics#
deontology - rule-based ethics
moral psychology should be empirical - how the mind works, not how it ought to work
Moral Foundations Theory
care
evolved to care for young
fairness
punish cheaters
finding altruistic partner
liberty
loyalty
want people that are good team players
authority
allows us to thrive in hierarchical settings
sanctity
starts with omnivoreâs dillema
survive pathogens
6.8.4.2.3. the conservative advantage#
Durkheim - basic unit is family, not individual
liberals only really value first three moral foundations
6.8.4.3. morality binds and blinds#
6.8.4.3.1. why are we so groupish#
group selection is controversial
here are 3 exhibits defending it
major transitions produce superorganisms
shared intentionality generates moral matrices
chimpanzees have no shared intentionality
genes and cultures coevolve
evolution can be fast
6.8.4.3.2. the hive switch#
two candidates for hive switch
oxytocin genes
mirror neurons
hive switch doesnât seem to be for everyone, but rather just for oneâs group
6.8.4.3.3. religion is a team sport#
descriptive definitions - describe what people think are moral
normative definitions - describe what is truly right
utilitarianism
deontology
belief in supernatural - could be accidental as by-product of hypersensitive agency detection device
religion can effectively surpress free-rider problem
6.8.4.3.4. disagreeing more constructively#
people are predisposed to ideologies
then there is serious confirmation bias
liberals and conservatives are both necessary to balance each other out
Manichaeism - polarization, believing one side only
imagine world with no countries, religion -> would probably be chaos
6.8.5. homo deus#
6.8.5.1. old problems: famine, war, plague#
famine, war, plague are less common now â what will take their place?
if these + ecological equilibrium are solved, do we need more?
plague
black death in 1330s - killed between 75-200 mil
smallpox plague in 1500s along with other diseases from Europe tothe Americas
spanish flu 1918 infectedabout 500 mil (1/3 of world population)
50-100 mil died
covid19 (as of jan 2021)
~1/2 mil dead
since 1980s, >30 mil AIDS death
âin the arms race between doctors and germs, doctors run fasterâ
war kills many fewer people these days
mutually assured destruction
made things like information / knoweldge more important (e.g. canât loot tech)
Anton Chekhov famously said that a gun appearing in the first act of a play will inevitably be fired in the third (âchekhovâs lawâ)
nowadays in real world, may note be the case
terrorism generally works more by evoking outrage
6.8.5.2. new goals: immortality, happiness and divinity#
immortality
ex. Ray Kurzweil at Google trying to âsolve deathâ
in 20th century, life expectancy went from forty to seventy
no clear line separates healing from upgrading
happiness
epicurus - happiness is goal of life
bentham/mill - happiness is pleasure - pain
suicide rates are ~25x higher in developed nations
2 levels
psychological level: happiness depends on expectations rather than objective conditions
biological level: both our expectations and our happiness are determined by our biochemistry
new drugs are constantly being developed and societal standards around them shift
divinity
biological engineering - rewriting genetic code
cyborg engineering - adding thinkgs like bionic hands, artificial eyes
engineering of non-organic beings - AIs
many of the the powers classical gods had are now possible through engineering
Knowledge that does not change behaviour is useless. But knowledge that changes behaviour quickly loses its relevance
the study of history aims above all to make us aware of possibilities we donât normally consider. Historians study the past not in order to repeat it, but in order to be liberated from it.
ex. capitalism, feminism, civil rights
ex. lawns
ppl thought living without pharoahs was inconceivable
6.8.5.3. PART I â Homo sapiens Conquers the World#
emotions are algorithms imbued by genes
religions sprung up w agriculture justifying animal cruelty
the founding idea of humanist religions such as liberalism, communism and Nazism is that Homo sapiens has some unique and sacred essence that is the source of all meaning and authority in the universe
no clear distinction between human and animals
evolution implies there is no eternal soul
literal meaning of the word âindividualâ is âsomething that cannot be dividedâ
what happens in the mind that doesnât happen in the brain?
possible that the sensations of consciousness / emotion are an unnecessary byproduct
clever hans (math horse)
Homo sapiens is the only species on earth capable of co-operating flexibly in large numbers
individuals favor fairness (ex. ultimatum game) but societies tolerate inequality
things can have subjective, objective, or intersubjective meaning (e.g. we agree money has value so it does)
6.8.5.4. PART II Homo Sapiens Gives Meaning to the World#
Religion is anything that confers superhuman legitimacy on human social structures. It legitimises human norms and values by arguing that they reflect superhuman laws
in theory, both science and religion are interested above all in the truth, and are destined to clash
in reality, neither cares much about the truth and thus they can coexist
religion is interested above all in order. It aims to create and maintain the social structure. Science is interested above all in in power.
engineers could still build a hi-tech Noahâs Ark for the upper caste, while leaving billions of others to drown
we have no scientific definition or measurement of happiness
not only do we possess far more power than ever before, but against all expectations, Godâs death did not lead to social collapse
central religious revolution of modernity was not losing faith in God; rather, it was gaining faith in humanity
at least in the West, God has become an abstract idea that some accept and others reject, but it makes little difference either way
modern people have differing ideas about extramarital affairs, but no matter what their position is, they tend to justify it in the name of human feelings rather than in the name of holy scriptures and divine commandments
my current political views, my likes and dislikes, and my hobbies and ambitions do not relfect my authentic self. Rather, they reflect my upbringing and social surrounding
liberal humanism, socalist humanism, evolutionary humanism
âunder liberalism, everyone is free to starveâ
papal infallibility (in which Pope can never err in matters of faith) became Catholic dogma only in 1870
before marx, people defined and divided themselves according to their views about God, not production methods
6.8.5.5. PART III Homo Sapiens Loses Control#
can people choose their desires in the first place?
ask yourself why do you think a particular though
do we value experiences or memories: ex. pick between dream vacation w/ no memories or decent vacation
liberal habitats such as democratic elections will become obsolete, bc Google can represent even my own political opinions better than myself
once AI agents evolve from oracles to agents, they can speak directly with each other (e.g. to schedule meetings etc.)
defenders of human individuality stand guard against the tyranny of the collective without realising it is now threatened from the opposite direction - losing meaning in a deluge of biological/electronic personalization
dataism says that the universe consists of data flows, and the value of any phenomenon or entity is determined by its contribution to data processing
dataism worships data
âwhat will happen to scoeity, politics and daily life when non-conscious but highly intelligent algorithms know us better than we know ourselves?â
6.8.6. Predictably Irrational#
by Dan Ariely, 2008
arbitrary coherence - market prices themselves that influence consumersâ willingness to pay. What this means is that demand is not, in fact, a completely separate force from supply.
Choices are always relatives
Adding a comparable worse option makes the comparable option seem better
Supply and demand doesnât always work
The price for black pearls was completely made up
People often stay anchored to the prices they first see
Social norms compete with market norms
Fining parents who pick up their children late
High price of ownership
Students who won tickets in a lottery would sell them for much more than buy them
Pepsi wins blind taste tests, coke wins shown ones
6.8.7. maybe you should talk to someone#
by Lori Gottlieb, 2019
happiness is statistically abnormal
âThereâs something likable in everyoneâ
surfing the internet etc. are just ways to distract ourselves
presenting problem - the issue that sends a person into therapy
âavoidantâ
Will you spot the insecurities that Iâm so skillful at hiding?
high-functioning = verbal, motivated, open, and responsible
âthe therapeutic act, not the therapeutic word.â
In idiot compassion, you avoid rocking the boat to spare peopleâs feelings, even though the boat needs rocking and your compassion ends up being more harmful than your honesty
creativity - the ability to grasp the essence of one thing and the essence of some very different thing and smash them together to create some entirely new thing
Your feelings donât have to mesh with what you think they should be
There is a continuing decision to be made as to whether to evade pain, or to tolerate it and therefore modify it
-
Cluster A (odd, bizarre, eccentric):
Paranoid PD, Schizoid PD, Schizotypal PD
Cluster B (dramatic, erratic):
Antisocial PD, Borderline PD, Histrionic PD, Narcissistic PD
Cluster C (anxious, fearful):
Avoidant PD, Dependent PD, Obsessive-Compulsive PD
When I see couples in therapy, often one or the other will complain, not âYou donât love meâ but âYou donât understand me.â
thereâs a difference between a criticism and a complaint: the former contains judgment while the latter contains a request
Follow your envyâit shows you what you want.
most of us arenât aware of how we actually spend our time or what we really do all day until we break it down hour by hour and say it out loud
In projection, a patient attributes his beliefs to another person; in projective identification, he sends them into another person
Did the patient feel understood?
conversion disorder = a personâs anxiety is âconvertedâ into neurologic conditions such as paralysis, balance issues, incontinence, blindness, deafness, tremors, or seizures
alexithymia = doesnât know what their feeling or donât have the words to express it
Sometimes people canât identify their feelings because they were talked out of them as children
Almost every woman I see apologizes for her feelings, especially her tears. I remember apologizing in Wendellâs office too. Perhaps men apologize preemptively, by holding their tears back.
âModern man thinks he loses somethingâtimeâwhen he does not do things quickly; yet he does not know what to do with the time he gains except kill it.â
âAvoidance is a simple way of coping by not having to cope.â
Reacting vs. responding = reflexive vs. chosen
what would we therapists do without the word wonder to broach a sensitive topic?
Are you sorry for what youâve done or are you simply trying to placate the other person who believes you should be sorry for the thing you feel completely justified in having done?
Her inner critic serves her: I donât have to take any action because Iâm worthless
You canât get through your pain by diminishing it
privacy (spaces in peopleâs psyches that everyone needs in healthy relationships) and secrecy (which stems from shame and tends to be corrosive)
In the best goodbyes, thereâs always the feeling that thereâs something more to say
6.8.8. attached (amir levine & rachel heller)#
3 main attachment styles
secure - comfortable with intimacy
anxious - crave intimacy, preoccupied / worried
avoidant - equate initimacy with loss in independence, minimize closeness
standard preach: âyour happiness is something that should come from within and should not be dependent on your lover or mate. Your well-being is not their responsibility and theirs is not yours.â
science
in prehistoric times, closeness with a partner had evolutionary benefits (secure)
in dangerous environment, less attached an quickly moving on is useful (avoidant)
in separate harsh environment, being intensely persistent and hypervigilant also makes sense (anxious)
studies
connection between infant and caretaker was as essential for childâs survival as food/water
fmri study - fmri hypothalamus fear response was much lower when partner was holding hand
strange situation test - babies happily explore new room with mother there, otherwise get upset and scared
being around good/partner in marriage can lower/raise blood pressure(baker)
people with anxious attachment style noticed emotion changes in synthetic faces faster
most people are only as needy as their unmet needs
6.8.9. polarization (ezra klein)#
Central thesis is that all politics is identity politics (i.e. based on group membership) rather than based on ideology. The separation of parties and peopleâs groups (+media consumption) are a positive-feedback cycle which reinforces further polarization.
Most people who voted chose the same party in 2016 that theyâd chosen in 2012. white voters without college educations swung sharply toward Trump, and their overrepresentation in electorally key states won him the election. - true even after pandemic
Everything had happened, and politically nothing had mattered. Opinions about Trump had barely budged.
âWhen someone shows you who they are, believe them.â
core argument of this book is that everyone engaged in American politics is engaged in identity politics.
As political institutions and actors become more polarized, they further polarize the public. This sets off a feedback cycle: to appeal to a yet more polarized public, institutions must polarize further; when faced with yet more polarized institutions, the public polarizes further, and so on.
We donât just use politics for our own ends. Politics uses us for its own ends.
Systems thinking, âis about understanding how accidents can happen when no parts are broken, or no parts are seen as broken.â
history
But then race became an area of disagreement. Democrats didnât just want to redistribute from rich northern whites to poor southern whites. They also wanted to redistribute from richer whites to poorer blacks. Furthermore, beginning in 1948, with President Harry Trumanâs military desegregation orders, the Democratic Party became a vehicle for civil rights, betraying its fundamental compact with the South.
the American political system was most calm and least polarized when America itself seemed to be on the verge of cracking apart.
Polarization is not extremism, but it is sorting
When polarization is driven by allegiance to political parties, it can be moderating.
ânegative partisanshipâ: partisan behavior driven not by positive feelings toward the party you support but negative feelings toward the party you oppose.
psychology
Evolutionarily, the power is in the mix of outlooks, not in one outlookâthatâs why this psychological diversity has survived.
people preferred to give their group less so long as it meant the gap between what they got and what the out-group got was bigger.
To Hate Like This Is to Be Happy Forever.
âThe living and dying through oneâs allegiance to either Duke or Carolina is no less real for being enacted through play and fandom,â
âanywhere in the world where people describe being lonely, they will alsoâthroughout their sleepâexperience more of something called âmicro-awakenings.â
Partisanship can now be thought of as a mega-identity, with all the psychological and behavioral magnifications that implies.
people with a lot of crosscutting identities tended to be more tolerant of outsiders than people with highly aligned identities.
One reason policy is not the driver of political disagreement is most people donât have very strong views about policy.
when awarding a college scholarshipâa task that should be completely nonpoliticalâRepublicans and Democrats cared more about the political party of the student than the studentâs GPA. belief that many of our most bitter political battles, and most of our worst political thinking, are mere misunderstandings. The cause of these misunderstandings? Too little informationâbe
Being better at math didnât just fail to help partisans converge on the right answer. It actually drove them further apart.
âthe cost to her of making a mistake on the science is zero,â but âthe cost of being out of synch with her peers potentially catastrophic,â making it âindividually rationalâ to put group dynamics first when thinking about issues like climate change.
demographics
A useful rule of thumb is that political power runs a decade behind demographics, with older, whiter, more Christian voters turning out at higher rates.
But cultural power runs a decade or more ahead of demography,
âIn the past five years, white liberals have moved so far to the left on questions of race and racism that they are now, on these issues, to the left of even the typical black voter,â writes Interlude
media
almost no one is forced to follow politics.
Netflixâs CEO Reed Hastings famously said his biggest competitor is sleep.
For much of American history, most newspapers were explicitly partisan, often including âDemocratâ or âRepublicanâ in the name
transition to a news industry that prized independence from party and ideology was driven by technological advances that changed the business model of newspapers.
The explosion of choice and competition carried by digital news upended this calculation again. To be interested in politics is to choose a side.
Ahler and Sood observe that the intensity of partisan feeling is increasing as the parties become more demographically different from each other, but the level of animosity seems to far outpace the level of difference.
The more interested in politics people were, the more political media they consumed, the more mistaken they were about the other party (the
âWhat if instead of telling people the things they need to know, we tell them what they want to know?â (Anchorman 2)
politically, itâs much easier to organize people against something than it is to unite them in an affirmative vision.
identity, once adopted, is harder to change than an opinion. An identity that binds you into a community you care about is costly and painful to abandon,
âThe defining characteristic of our moment is that parties are weak while partisanship is strong,â share of Americans who can name their governor has been declining, even as the share that can name the vice president has held steady.
as we give more to national candidates and less to local candidates, that creates incentives for candidates to nationalize themselves, focusing on the polarizing issues that energize donors in every zip code rather than the local issues that specifically matter in their states and districts. parties, and particularly the Republican Party, are losing control of whom they nominate. But once a party nominates someoneâonce it nominates anyoneâthat person is guaranteed the support of both the partyâs elites and its voters.
âvast majority of the stable democraciesâ in the world were parliamentary regimes, where whoever wins legislative power also wins executive power.
But a system like this can also encourage crisisâcrises where, in other countries, âthe armed forces were often tempted to intervene as a mediating power.â10 This is why there are no long-standing presidential democracies save for the United States.
The system works not through formal mechanisms that ensure the settlement of intractable disputes but through informal norms of compromise,
We became disgusted with the ways that local politics played out nationally.
This asymmetry between the parties, which journalists and scholars often brush aside or whitewash in a quest for âbalance,â constitutes a huge obstacle to effective governance.
party differences
Democrats have an immune system of diversity and democracy.
as of January 2019, conservatives still lead, 35â26. Three-quarters of Republicans identify as conservative, while only half of Democrats call themselves liberalsâand for Democrats, thatâs a historic high point.
Democrats have lost two of the last five presidential elections due to the electoral collegeâthe only times thatâs happened in American history
By a margin of 57â37, Republicans wanted their party to become more conservative; by a margin of 54â41, Democrats wanted their party to become more moderate
solutions: bombproofing, democratizing, and balancing.
bombproofing: where congressional inaction can do great damage, we should ask ourselves whether the upside of congressional deliberation truly outweighs the risk of unnecessary disaster.
A quick survey of Europe, where multiparty democracy is common and plenty of countries are undergoing their own political crises, is enough to curb expectations.
balancing: rather than balacing things between states, balance between parties
Supreme Court so it has fifteen justices: each party gets to appoint five, and then the ten partisan justices must unanimously appoint the remaining five.
democratizing
we give too much attention to national politics, which we can do very little to change, and too little attention to state and local politics,
For all our problems, we have been a worse and uglier country at almost every other point in our history.
The Varieties of Democracy Project, which has been surveying experts on the state of global democracies since 1900, gave the US political system a 48 on a 1 to 100 scale in 1945 and a 59 in 1965. It was only after the civil rights movement that America began scoring in the â70s and â80s, marking it as a largely successful democracy.
6.8.10. freud#
Id â set of instinctual trends
âcontrary impulses exist side by side, without cancelling each other out. ⌠There is nothing in the id that could be compared with negation ⌠nothing in the id which corresponds to the idea of time.â
Ego â organized and realistic
Super-ego â analyzes and moralizes â mediates between id and ego
âThe goal of therapy is to turn neurotic misery into everyday unhappinessâ (attributed to freud)
6.8.3.2. social cement#
6.8.3.2.1. families#
altruism makes sense for kin - wasps, ants
part of kin selection theory by Hamilton
some ants are sterile and only defend nests
genes try to propagate themselves not individuals or groups
\(r\) - represents degree of relatedness
brother = 1/2
aunt = 1/4
cousin = 1/8
for some organisms, like slime mold, r=1
higher average r leads to more altruism
children look after themselves first, then siblings
parents need to teach them to share
children are biologically inclined to listen to their parents when young
biological evidence: wealthy people focus on boy children, poor on girls
measure in how many years after first child for next child
makes sense since maleâs reproductive potential is more affected by societal status
this same trend should show up for siblings (poor children are nicer to girl siblings)
parents grieve most of children around adolescent age
this maps perfectly the reproductive potential of !Kung people
6.8.3.2.2. darwin and the savages#
evolution: kin-selection -> reciprocal altruism (tit for tat) -> higher morals
against group selection - even if it helped a group, it would start to decay within the group
6.8.3.2.3. friends#
helping others is not zero-sum
lets you catch big game, spread information
late 1970s Axelrod devises competition for prisonerâs dillema programs
TIT for TAT programs wins - do what person did last
very simple for early ancestors to implement
designed for individuals not groups
TIT for TAT doesnât work unless lots of people do it
kin selection gave it a boost
not sure about aunts, uncles, etc.
people try to maintain appearances of dignity
once reciprocal altruism is entrenched, can have âgood for the groupâ type genes
6.8.3.2.4. darwinâs conscience#
moral guidance is made to be guided by peers / parents
lying can be useful
lying can be genetically made exciting to teach its usefulness
modern society generally has more lying
this is to be expected as groups get larger and have more immigration and emigration